
President’s Corner
October 30, 2025
Paul Burkhalter, NOSSCR President
So sure, so wrong
We have all met new representatives excited about how well they are doing representing claimants, who may claim “how easy this is.” What is scarier is when you meet representatives who have been doing this for many years that make this same claim. Often people make claims about great accomplishments that would have happened anyway.
When this happens, you are seeing the Dunning–Kruger effect in action. This describes a well-documented cognitive bias in which individuals with limited knowledge or competence in a domain overestimate their ability. First identified by psychologists David Dunning and Justin Kruger in 1999, the effect arises because the same lack of skill that leads to poor performance also impairs a person’s ability to recognize their own deficiencies. Nowhere is this more consequential than in the realm of Social Security disability representation, where claimants depend on representatives to navigate a dense, rule-bound system that blends law, medicine, and administrative procedure. The stakes are high—both for the claimants’ livelihoods and for the integrity of the adjudicatory process—and yet the barriers to entry for representatives are comparatively low.
In the Social Security disability system, non-attorney representatives and newly licensed attorneys alike often begin taking cases with little training beyond an introductory course or limited observation of hearings. Many develop a misplaced sense of confidence after a handful of favorable outcomes, mistaking luck or a lenient ALJ for mastery of the law. They start to believe they have it all figured out. This early success reinforces the illusion of competence that the Dunning–Kruger effect predicts. Without a deep understanding of the sequential evaluation process, vocational analysis, or medical equivalency rules, such representatives may advise clients poorly, fail to develop the record properly, or make procedural errors that are invisible to them but fatal to the claimant’s case.
That early success is where the Dunning–Kruger trap really sets in. Because hearings are technically “non-adversarial,” the system doesn’t always expose errors right away. Administrative Law Judges often help fill in the gaps to make sure the record is complete, and sometimes even weakly prepared cases get approved. When that happens, the inexperienced representative walks away thinking, “I must be doing something right.” In reality, they may have missed critical issues — like onset dates, RFC analysis, DLI issues or proper development of treating source opinions — but no one told them. The Dunning–Kruger effect thus flourishes in an environment where feedback loops are weak and results are not directly tied to the quality of performance.
Another manifestation of this effect arises when representatives misunderstand the depth of medical or vocational evidence required to meet the evidentiary standards under Social Security Rulings or regulations. A representative who has never read HALLEX or POMS in detail may confidently declare that a claimant “meets a listing” or that “the vocational expert will have to find no jobs,” without realizing the complexity of medical equivalency analysis or the nuances of transferable skills. This overconfidence not only misleads claimants but also damages professional credibility with ALJs, vocational experts, and the Social Security Administration staff who must process flawed submissions.
Conversely, experienced representatives—those who have spent years reviewing denials, drafting briefs, and analyzing unfavorable decisions—often experience the opposite bias: a recognition of how little certainty exists in the process. These practitioners tend to be more cautious, more meticulous in record development, and more willing to seek expert opinions or vocational evidence. In Dunning and Kruger’s terms, they “know enough to know how much they don’t know.” Ironically, this humility can make them appear less confident than less-skilled peers, even though their competence is far greater.
So how can we counter this effect? Awareness is the first step. Just knowing that overconfidence is a predictable trap helps representatives pause before assuming they’ve mastered the process. Mentorship and continuing education — like what NOSSCR provides — are also key. Representatives who actively seek feedback, study unfavorable decisions, and stay up to date on new rulings are far less likely to fall victim to Dunning–Kruger.
At the end of the day, Social Security disability work is humbling. Every case is different, every ALJ has their own approach, and the rules are constantly evolving. The best representatives are the ones who approach the process with curiosity and respect — who understand that confidence should come from preparation, not from assumption. The Dunning–Kruger effect reminds us that the biggest danger in this field isn’t ignorance itself; it’s not realizing that we might be ignorant.






