Tom Krause

Why Statute and Caselaw Still Require ALJs to Identify and Explain Inconsistencies

Effective January 6, 2025, SSA rescinded SSR 00-4p and replaced it with SSR 24-3p. The agency’s stated position is straightforward: it “will no longer require our adjudicators to identify and resolve conflicts between occupational information provided by VSs and VEs and information in the DOT.” SSA contends that this change frees ALJs from the obligation to ask vocational experts about conflicts with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and to explain how any such conflicts were resolved. It does not.

SSA’s position misunderstands the legal landscape. The duty to identify and resolve conflicts in vocational expert testimony does not originate from SSR 00-4p. It derives from the Social Security Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and decades of federal appellate precedent. To the extent SSR 24-3p purports to eliminate this duty, it conflicts with binding authority and cannot stand.

The Statutory Foundation for Conflict Resolution

The requirement that ALJs address conflicts in the evidence does not depend on any Social Security Ruling. It flows directly from the Social Security Act itself. Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1), the Commissioner’s findings and decisions “shall be based upon the preponderance of the evidence” and state “the reason or reasons upon which it is based.” This mandate requires ALJs to weigh conflicting evidence and explain how they resolved evidentiary disputes. When vocational expert testimony conflicts with the DOT, which SSA’s own regulations recognize as a source of “reliable job information” under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(d) and 416.966(d), the ALJ cannot simply ignore the conflict. The statute demands that the decision rest on a reasoned assessment of all the evidence.

The Administrative Procedure Act reinforces this obligation. Under 5 U.S.C. § 557(c), agency decisions must “include a statement of . . . findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.” When the DOT describes a job one way and a vocational expert describes it another, the conflict presents a material issue of fact. The APA requires the ALJ to address it. SSR 00-4p did not create this obligation; it merely articulated what the statutes already required. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943); Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 

Federal Courts Required Conflict Resolution Before SSR 00-4p Existed

Circuit courts were requiring ALJs to identify and resolve conflicts between VE testimony and the DOT well before SSR 00-4p was issued in December 2000. See, e.g., Porch v. Chater, 115 F.3d 567, 572 (8th Cir. 1997). The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir. 1999), exemplifies this pre-existing duty. The court held that when a VE’s testimony conflicts with the DOT, the ALJ must investigate the conflict and explain the basis for relying on the VE’s testimony. This holding rested on the substantial evidence standard and the ALJ’s duty to develop the record, not on any agency ruling.

Similarly, in Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 146–47 (5th Cir. 2000), decided just before SSR 00-4p’s publication, the Fifth Circuit reversed a denial of benefits where the ALJ relied on VE testimony that conflicted with the DOT without obtaining an explanation. The court emphasized that because “the DOT is the ‘best source for how a job is generally performed,'” an unexplained conflict undermines the reliability of the vocational evidence. These decisions reflect an understanding that conflict resolution is intrinsic to reasoned decision-making, not a procedural nicety created by SSR 00-4p.

Circuit Court Decisions Ground the Duty in Statute, Not the SSR

Since SSR 00-4p’s issuance, federal appellate courts have consistently framed the conflict-resolution requirement as deriving from statutory obligations, not merely from the Ruling itself. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152–54 (9th Cir. 2007), is particularly instructive. While the court cited SSR 00-4p, it grounded its holding in the requirement that an ALJ’s decision be supported by substantial evidence, citing Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995). The court explained that unexplained conflicts between VE testimony and the DOT undermine the evidentiary foundation for the decision. This reasoning survives SSR 00-4p’s rescission because it rests on the substantial evidence requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), not on the Ruling.

The Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 735–36 (7th Cir. 2006), holding that when VE testimony “apparently conflicts with the [DOT],” the ALJ has a duty to “elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict.” The court did not treat this duty as flowing solely from SSR 00-4p, but also couches its decision in terms of a decision supported by substantial evidence. As the court observed, “[a]n ALJ may not simply ignore [conflicts] . . . and must explain how the conflict was resolved.”

In Overman v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit again emphasized that “[w]hen . . . expert testimony conflicts with the DOT, the ALJ must explain the conflict and explain why he chose to rely on the vocational expert.” This duty exists because “the DOT… creates a rebuttable presumption as to a job’s requirements,” and the ALJ cannot make reasoned findings without addressing contrary evidence.

The “Logical Bridge” Doctrine Requires Conflict Resolution

Many courts have adopted a “logical bridge” requirement holding that ALJ decisions must build an “accurate and logical bridge” from the evidence to the conclusion. This doctrine, articulated in cases like Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000), as amended (Dec. 13, 2000), and Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996), requires ALJs to address conflicting evidence and explain their resolution. When VE testimony conflicts with the DOT, the ALJ cannot build a logical bridge to the conclusion that the claimant can perform specific jobs without explaining why the VE’s testimony should be credited over the DOT’s contrary description.

The logical bridge doctrine predates SSR 00-4p and will survive SSR 24-3p. It derives from the requirements of reasoned decision-making embedded in the Social Security Act and the APA. No agency ruling can eliminate the judicial requirement that agency decisions explain their evidentiary basis.

Courts Continue Enforcing Conflict Resolution

The recent decision in Jennifer W. v. Bisignano, No. 24-CV-4127 (DJF), 2025 WL 3186944 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2025), demonstrates that courts are continuing to enforce the conflict-resolution requirement. Asha Sharma, a NOSSCR member from Minnesota, represented the plaintiff. The court held that “when there is a conflict between a VE’s testimony and the DOT, the ALJ has an affirmative duty to: (1) resolve the conflict before relying on the VE evidence; and (2) ‘explain the resolution of the conflict irrespective of how the conflict was identified.'” The court cited both SSR 00-4p and Moore v. Colvin, 769 F.3d 987, 989–90 (8th Cir. 2014), emphasizing that “[t]he ALJ is not absolved of this duty merely because the VE responds ‘yes’ when asked if [his] testimony is consistent with the DOT.”

The Jennifer W. court grounded its analysis in the substantial evidence standard and the “logical bridge” doctrine—not merely in SSR 00-4p. The court explained that “the ALJ must also explain how any material inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record were considered and resolved,” citing SSR 96-8p and numerous district court decisions applying this principle. This reasoning survives SSR 24-3p’s rescission of SSR 00-4p because it rests on the statutory requirement that ALJ decisions be supported by substantial evidence and the judicial requirement that decisions build a logical bridge from evidence to conclusion.

The Jennifer W., 2025 WL 3186944 decision also addressed internally contradictory VE testimony—a distinct but related issue. The VE testified both that the claimant could perform jobs requiring “detailed” instructions under DOT Level 2 reasoning and that the claimant’s RFC limitation to “simple, routine and repetitive tasks precludes the ability to carry out detailed, written and oral instructions.” The court held this self-contradiction warranted remand, citing Saimalo T. v. O’Malley, No. 2:24-CV-01241-MDC, 2025 WL 2073970 (D. Nev. July 22, 2025), for the proposition that “[w]here a VE’s testimony appears to be self-contradictory, remand is appropriate.” This holding reinforces the broader principle that ALJs cannot rely on unreliable or inconsistent vocational evidence—regardless of what SSR 24-3p says.

VE Methodology and SSR 24-3p

The Jennifer W. court further addressed the VE methodology for estimating job numbers. When the VE described his approach as a “homemade way” of counting jobs, relying on vague references to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, the court found it insufficient. Citing the Supreme Court’s discussion in Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97 (2019), and the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Brace v. Saul, 970 F.3d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2020), the court rejected “the notion that the VE’s years of experience were alone enough to enable him to divine accurate job numbers data.” The court required VEs to articulate an intelligible, well-accepted methodology—not merely assert expertise. This requirement flows from the substantial evidence standard, not from any SSR that SSA can rescind at will.

SSR 24-3p Cannot Override Binding Statutory and Judicial Authority

Social Security Rulings are interpretive rules that do not have the force and effect of law. As SSA itself acknowledges, SSRs “represent precedent final opinions and orders and statements of policy and interpretations” that are “binding on all components of the Social Security Administration.” 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). But SSRs cannot override statutes, validly promulgated regulations, or binding circuit precedent.

The statutory requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) and 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) demand reasoned decision-making that addresses material conflicts in the evidence. SSA’s own regulations at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d) and 416.966(d) recognize the DOT as a source of reliable occupational information that the agency will “take administrative notice” of. When a VE’s testimony conflicts with this officially recognized source, the conflict constitutes a material evidentiary dispute that the ALJ must address under the statutory requirement for reasoned decision-making.

Moreover, federal courts—not SSA—are the final arbiters of what constitutes substantial evidence under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The circuits have consistently held that unexplained conflicts between VE testimony and the DOT undermine the considerable evidence basis for a decision. SSA cannot issue a ruling declaring that such conflicts need not be addressed; the courts will continue to reverse decisions that fail to meet the substantial evidence standard, as Jennifer W. demonstrates.

Practical Implications for Representatives

The rescission of SSR 00-4p does not change what representatives should do at hearings. Continue to identify conflicts between VE testimony and the DOT. Continue to ask VEs whether their testimony is consistent with the DOT and, if not, to explain the basis for any departure. Continue to object when ALJs attempt to rely on VE testimony that conflicts with the DOT without obtaining and crediting an adequate explanation. And as Jennifer W. illustrates, challenge VEs on their methodology for deriving job numbers—courts are increasingly unwilling to accept vague assertions of expertise without intelligible explanation.

When briefing appeals, do not rely solely—or even primarily—on SSR 00-4p or the fact of its rescission; instead, ground your arguments in the statutory requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) and 5 U.S.C. § 557(c), and cite the circuit precedent requiring conflict resolution. Emphasize that these requirements derive from binding statutory and judicial authority that SSR 24-3p cannot override. Cite Jennifer W. for the proposition that courts are continuing to enforce these requirements post-SSR 24-3p.

Frame the issue this way: SSA’s position is that rescinding an interpretive ruling eliminates the underlying legal duty. But SSR 00-4p did not create the duty to address evidentiary conflicts; it merely articulated what the statute and caselaw already required. The statute has not changed. The caselaw has not changed. The duty remains.

Conclusion

SSA may declare that it no longer requires ALJs to identify and resolve conflicts with the DOT. But the agency cannot, by administrative fiat, eliminate duties imposed by statute and recognized by federal courts for decades. The requirement that ALJ decisions address material evidentiary conflicts flows from the Social Security Act’s mandate that decisions rest on “the preponderance of the evidence” and the APA’s requirement of reasoned decision-making. These obligations existed before SSR 00-4p and will continue after SSR 24-3p.

To the extent SSR 24-3p purports to excuse ALJs from addressing conflicts between VE testimony and the DOT, it conflicts with binding statutory and judicial authority. As Jennifer W., 2025 WL 3186944 demonstrates, the courts will reverse decisions that rely on unexplained conflicts and unreliable vocational methodology. The rescission of SSR 00-4p changes the agency’s internal guidance; it does not change the law.

---

This is a guest column. The views expressed in this column are the views of the author alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of NOSSCR, NOSSCR’s leadership, or NOSSCR’s staff.

---