The Social Security Forum

Circuit Court Considerations: Harmless Error at Step Five, a “Modest” Logical Bridge, and a Dissent Worth Your Time

September 25, 2026

Adriana de la Torre, NOSSCR Sustaining Member

Calhoun v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 24-1315 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 2026) (published), is a split decision that touches three issues we see constantly: how much weight a one-time consultative exam gets under the 2017 regulations, how far the “logical bridge” requirement goes, and when harmless error will save an ALJ’s decision. Judge Richardson wrote for the majority, joined by Judge Harris. Judge Gregory dissented.

The facts

Calhoun applied for SSI in September 2019, at age 23, alleging blood clots, migraines, leg and foot numbness, high blood pressure, obesity, and agoraphobia. The ALJ found several severe impairments, including obesity, hypertension, right-knee dislocation, agoraphobia, anxiety, and depression. She still denied benefits, assessing an RFC for light work with restrictions. Those included unskilled, routine, repetitive tasks at a non-production pace, only occasional public interaction, and, critically, up to six hours of standing and walking. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner.

What the majority held

The consultative exam. Dr. Broman-Fulks examined Calhoun once and opined that she was “severely impaired” in relating to others and tolerating work stress. Two state-agency psychologists reviewed the record, including his report, and found lesser limitations. The ALJ found his opinion less persuasive.

The majority affirmed. Under the 2017 regulations, no opinion gets deference or controlling weight. Supportability and consistency are the key factors, and the ALJ must address both. The court emphasized that Dr. Broman-Fulks based his severity rating on the history Calhoun and her father reported rather than on his own clinical findings, which were fairly narrow. That meant its persuasiveness turned on whether the rest of the record backed it up. The ALJ pointed to primary-care notes documenting normal mental status and to the lack of ongoing mental-health treatment, and the court found that sufficient. It also treated the case as materially similar to Drumgold v. Commissioner, 144 F.4th 596 (4th Cir. 2025).

Standing and walking. This is the practical takeaway. Both reviewing physicians limited Calhoun to four hours of standing and walking, and the ALJ’s RFC gave her six. The court called this a close question and noted that Calhoun argued “with some force” that the ALJ hadn’t adequately explained the departure. It also repeated its warnings about extrapolating from daily activities to sustained work capacity. But it never decided whether the explanation was adequate, because any error was harmless.

At step five, the ALJ had asked the vocational expert about a four-hour hypothetical, and the jobs she relied on (mail clerk, router, and marker) were the ones the expert gave for that more restrictive limit. She did not rely on the housekeeping cleaner job or the larger marker number available at six hours. The court held that Calhoun bore the burden of showing harm and couldn’t meet it, since the VE’s testimony showed the outcome wouldn’t have changed.

Education. The regulations make completed grade level the default measure of education unless other evidence contradicts it. Calhoun repeatedly reported graduating high school and later pursued cosmetology coursework. The court acknowledged her special-education services but noted that the ALJ accounted for her limitations by restricting her to unskilled, routine work at a non-production pace.

The “logical bridge.” The court reaffirmed that the requirement is real, but called it “a modest one.” The ALJ’s reasoning must be discernible so the court isn’t left to guess. It doesn’t demand a particular level of detail.

The dissent

Judge Gregory would have reversed on two grounds.

Step three and the “stock language” problem. The dissent argued the ALJ lacked substantial evidence to find that Calhoun didn’t meet Listing 12.06. It stressed that Dr. Broman-Fulks was the government’s own expert, and that his “severe” ratings mapped onto the “extreme” limitations the listing’s B criteria require. It also argued that the “normal” psychiatric exam entries in the primary-care notes appeared to be stock language in a rarely updated section of the chart. Its example: for about sixteen months, the visit summaries said Calhoun “has been on the Keto diet for four months.” The dissent also read the record as showing carefully managed symptoms, with Calhoun’s agoraphobia controlled by a sheltered routine and her parents’ presence, and argued that her hobbies (painting, crafts, one friend) were consistent with that.

The majority answered in footnote 6: “normal” wasn’t the only description in the notes, the two reviewing psychologists read them differently, and choosing among competing readings is the ALJ’s task.

Regular and continuing work. The dissent also argued that the ALJ never made an explicit finding on Calhoun’s ability to sustain work under SSR 96-8p, despite testimony about headaches roughly ten days a month and her history of dropping programs because of anxiety. The VE had testified that more than five unexcused absences a year would preclude employment, and the dissent noted that neither reviewing consultant addressed her capacity for a full 8-hour, 5-day schedule. The majority rejected this in footnote 8, reasoning that an RFC finding implicitly contains a finding that the claimant can work on a regular and continuing basis.

Practical takeaways

  1. Read the VE transcript before building an appeal around an RFC inconsistency. If the ALJ posed a more restrictive hypothetical and relied on the jobs given for it, an unexplained RFC discrepancy may not get you a remand, and you carry the burden of showing harm.
  2. Don’t count on stock-language arguments first surfacing on appeal. The dissent’s version didn’t carry a majority. Raising chart issues at the hearing level, while there’s still a chance to build the record, gives the argument a better chance.
  3. Build the “regular and continuing basis” record with specifics. After Calhoun, a bare “no explicit finding” argument is harder to win in this circuit. Concrete testimony on frequency of headaches and missed programs, tied to the VE’s absenteeism testimony, gives the argument something to stand on.
  4. Don’t overread the decision. The majority itself called it narrow and said it wasn’t suggesting the record compelled the ALJ’s conclusions.

Got any questions? Schedule a consultation with us. I’m here to help. It’s a lot to take in, but we’ll get through it together. After all, navigating these waters is always easier when you’ve got someone to chat with.


The views and opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of NOSSCR, its leadership, or staff.